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CASES NOTED
INCOME TAX-REIMBURSEMENT OF EMPLOYEE'S INCIDENTAL
MOVING EXPENSES-AN INEQUALITY REAPPEARS
IN THE CODE
On December 1, 1961, the petitioner was permanently transferred
by his employer from California to Wyoming. The transfer was made
solely at the behest of his employer. The petitioner attempted to buy a
residence for his family in Wyoming, but due to a significant housing
shortage, was unable to do so until December 20, 1961.' Therefore, the
petitioner was forced to reside in a hotel while his family remained in
California. During the interim he continued to maintain his family but
was reimbursed by his employer only for his meals, lodging, and incidental
expenses while at the hotel prior to his family's arrival. The petitioner did
not include 718.54 dollars, the amount of such reimbursement, in his gross
income. The Commissioner determined that the reimbursement was in-
cludable in gross income2 and not deductible because it constituted
personal living expenses.3 On petition to the Tax Court, held, for petition-
er: where the move was solely at the behest of and primarily for the
benefit of the employer and the temporary expenditures were outside the
control of the taxpayer, reimbursements for temporary living costs at the
new job site were not compensatory in nature and are excluded from gross
income. Homer H. Starr, 46 T.C. No. 78 (Sept. 26, 1966).'
The sixteenth amendment gives Congress the power to tax income
"from whatever source derived . . . ."' The term income has not, however,
lent itself to an exact definition.6 In Commissioner v. Smith, 7 the court in
dealing with the issue of compensation for personal services stated:
1. The house was unavailable until January 20, 1962, and the petitioner and his family
did not actually move in until January 29, 1962.
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a).
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 262 provides: "Except as otherwise expressly provided
. ..no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses."
4. This case was appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on December 27, 1967.
5. The statutory definition of gross income in § 61(a) of the 1954 Code provides that
(,gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including but not limited
to the following items .... "
6. The Supreme Court made an early but futile attempt to provide an all inclusive
definition of income in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920). In Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) the Court refused to lend credence to the taxpayer's
contention that the definition of income as used in Eisner required a narrow reading of
section 61(a).
[In Eisner ... [the term income was defined] as "the gain derived from capital,
from labor, or from both combined." The Court was there endeavoring to deter-
mine whether the distribution of a corporate stock dividend constituted a realized
gain to the stockholder . . . . [Ilt was not meant to provide a touchstone to all
future gross income questions.
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., supra at 430.
7. 324 U.S. 177, 181 (1944).
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"Section 22(a) [the forerunner of Section 61(a)] ... is broad enough
to include in taxable income any economic or financial benefit conferred
on the employee as compensation, whatever the form or mode by which
it is effected." In Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,8 the court in
determining that a "windfall" gain was within the scope of section 61 (a),
stated:
Congress applied no limitation as to the source of taxable
receipts, nor restrictive labels as to their nature. And the Court
has given a liberal construction to this broad phraseology in
recognition of the intention of Congress to tax all gains except
those specifically exempted .... [W]e cannot but ascribe con-
tent to the catchall provision [§ 22(a) of the 1939 Code] ....
The importance of that phrase has been too frequently recog-
nized . . . to say now that it adds nothing to the meaning of
"gross income." 9
Accordingly, the Service's position was that the taxpayer was denied
exclusion of the reimbursement from income, and where the taxpayer
included the reimbursement in income, his request for a deduction was
disallowed.1" The court's position was uniform, whether the employee was
new or old."
Revenue Ruling 54-429,12 however, provided an exception to the
Smith'3 concept of income by excluding from income reimbursements re-
ceived by an employee for moving expenses. This exclusion was limited to
8. Supra note 6.
9. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., supra note 6, at 430.
10. OLD EMPLOYEES:
In Le Grand v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1952), the taxpayer's
employer gave him one fourth of the purchase price of a house at his new job location.
The court held that such payment was renumeration for his continued services and was
not a gift as the taxpayer contended. In Jesse S. Rinehart, 18 T.C. 672 (1952), the em-
ployee was required to include in income money given to him by his employer as part
payment for a house at his new location. The case was distinguished from Otto Sorg
Schairer, infra note 11, in that Rinehart had suffered no loss on the sale of his old residence;
whereas Schairer's payment was expressly provided to compensate him for any loss on the
sale of his old residence. See also H. Willis Nichols, 13 T.C. 916 (1949), where the taxpayer
was denied a deduction from income for the cost of moving his household effects at his
own expense.
NEW EMPLOYEES:
In Baxter D. McClain, 2 B.T.A. 726 (1925), a new employee was denied a deduction
for reimbursed moving (travel expenses and freight charges) expenses paid by his new
employer. The employee in York v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1947), was
denied a deduction for direct moving expenses incurred by him in moving to a new job
location.
11. Ibid. But see Otto Sorg Schairer, 9 T.C. 549 (1947), overruled by Harris W.
Bradley, 39 T.C. 652 (1963), aff'd, 324 F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1963). The Tax Court concluded
that the employer's payment to an existing employee for any loss he incurred on the sale
of his residence was not income to the employee. The move was made for the benefit
of the employer. The employee included the payment as part of the "amount realized" on
the sale of the house and not as additional income.
12. 1954-2 Cum. BULL. 53.
13. Supra note 7.
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payments received by an employee from his employer in moving himself
and his family from one permanent station to another permanent station.
Since the ruling required that the move be primarily for the employer's
benefit, the Service concluded that such payments were not "compensatory
in nature" and therefore not includable in income.'4 The ruling did not,
however, apply to expenses incurred by the employee after he reached his
new station and was awaiting permanent facilities," nor did it apply to
reimbursements received by an employee from a new employer.'6
In John E. Cavanagh7 the Tax Court successfully extended the ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule laid down in Revenue Ruling 54-429"s
to include both reimbursed direct and indirect moving expenses. In Cava-
nagh the employee was required to wait a period of ten to fifteen days at
his new job location for the delivery of his household effects. Under an
agreement with his employer he was reimbursed for the amount of living
costs he sustained which were in excess of the ordinary living expenses of
his family while his household effects were in transit. 9 The Tax Court
excluded this payment from gross income, stating that reimbursements for
extraordinary living expenses did not come within the purview of section
61 (a) .20
14. [It is concluded that (1) amounts received by an employee from his employer
representing allowances or reimbursements for moving himself, his immediate family,
household goods and personal effects, in case of a transfer in the interest of his
employer, from one official station to another for permanent duty, do not represent
compensation within the meaning of section 22(a) [forerunner of section 61(a)
of the 1954 Code] .... In any case in which the transfer is made primarily for the
benefit of the employee, any allowance or reimbursement received by the employee
is includable in his gross income.
Supra note 12, at 53.
Prior to this ruling, the only allowable exclusion for reimbursed moving expenses was in
G.M.C. 18430, 1937-1 Cum. BULL. 137. An employee who was transferred by the State
Department at the Government's convenience, could exclude from income the amount
received by him as reimbursement for the cost of the moving expenses of himself and his
family. Contra, I.T. 3022, XV-2 Cum. BULL. 76 (1936), requiring the inclusion in income
of the cost of transporting dependents of Coast Guard personnel, the cost of which was
paid by the Government; O.D. 1135, 5 Cum. BULL. 174 (1921), holding that costs of
transportation paid by the government for dependents of army officers are in the nature
of additional compensation.
15. This type of expense is generally termed an "incidental" or "nontransportational"
expense in contrast to the term "direct" moving expense. The latter includes the cost of
transporting the taxpayer and his family to the new location, moving furniture and other
household effects from the old to the new residence, and the expenses incurred by the
taxpayer and his family for meals and lodging while in transit to the new location. Examples
of incidental expenses include meals and lodging at the new job location, prior house
hunting trips, and expenses related to the sale of the taxpayer's old residence.
16. Although no mention was made of reimbursements received by a new employee
in Rev. Rul. 54-429, supra note 12, the problem was soon decided in Rev. Rul. 55-140,
1955-1 Cum. BULL. 317. The Service took the position that such reimbursements must be
included in income and were nondeductible as personal, living, or family expenses.
17. 36 T.C. 300 (1961).
18. Supra note 12.
19. Supra note 17, at 301.
20. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954. The Commissioner subsequently issued a nonacquiescence,
1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 6. But cf. Harris W. Bradley, 39 T.C. 652 (1963), aff'd, 324 F.2d 610
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Cavanagh also recognized the problem of determining when a tax-
payer is a new or old employee.21 Although this issue is no longer pertinent
in the area of direct moving expenses,22 it still appears in the area of
incidental expenses.
A further attempt to extend Revenue Ruling 54-42923 was made by
the Tax Court in Walter H. Mendel.24 The incidental moving expenses
in excess of the reimbursement received from the employer were deducted
from income. The court sustained the deduction by extending the decision
of Cavanagh on the ground that reasonable amounts spent by the taxpayer
in a transfer of job locations at the employer's request were not a personal
expense and were therefore deductible as an ordinary and necessary
business expense.2 ' The Fourth Circuit reversed, 26 however, stating that
while Revenue Ruling 54-429 excluded certain reimbursements from gross
income, it did not make unreimbursed expenses deductible per se. The
court concluded that the expenses constituted personal living expenses and
were therefore not deductible.2
(4th Cir. 1963) (reimbursement for loss on sale of residence) ; Paul Light, 30 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 1611 (1961), aff'd per curium, 310 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1962) (deduction denied for
reimbursed expenses incurred at the new job location) ; Ernest Pederson, 46 T.C. No. 13
(May 2, 1966) (reimbursement included in income for expenses incurred in sale of old
residence). For cases involving new employees see Wells v. Commissioner, 356 F.2d 922
(3d Cir. 1966) (loss incurred on a lease deposit reimbursed by the employer constituted
taxable income) ; Koons v. United States, 315 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1963) (the fair market
value of the additional compensation is the measure of such benefit); United States v.
Woodall, 255 F.2d 370 (10th Cir. 1957) (reimbursement for actual travel and moving
expenses included in income) ; Willis B. Ferebee, 39 T.C. 801 (1963) (reimbursement for
direct and incidental moving expenses constituted taxable income); Alan J. Vandermade,
36 T.C. 607 (1961) (reimbursed moving expenses of "loaned" employee included in income).
21. In Cavanagh, supra note 17, the petitioner while living in Washington, D.C.
accepted a position with a company located in California. The petitioner remained in Wash-
ington for a period of five weeks before moving to California. During such time, he
engaged in business for his new employer. The Tax Court held that he was an old em-
ployee. This case should be contrasted with Alan J. Vandermade, supra note 20, where
the petitioner went to work for a new employer on a temporary basis not exceeding six
months. This arrangement was entered into between the petitioner's old and new employer.
Both employers paid the petitioner a salary during the trial period. If the petitioner
or the new employer were not satisfied, the petitioner was free to resume work for his old
employer. When the petitioner decided to continue working for his new employer, reimburse-
ments received for moving expenses from the new employer were required to be included
in income. The court held that the petitioner, at the time of the second agreement, was
a new employee. See also Judge Hoit's concurring opinion in Willis B. Ferebee, supra note
20, at 806, dealing with the new versus old distinction:
I feel that we should not compound the confusion already evident from the line
of cases . . . deciding this case on what seems to me to be the unrealistic and
arbitrary basis of oldness or newness of the employment involved . . . . We
should look to the particular facts and circumstances of each case. . . . The fact
that in the new employment cases the facts generally support a finding of taxable
income does not mean that any payment to an "old" employee is tax free.
22. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 217, applicable to taxpayers after December 31, 1963.
23. Supra note 12.
24. 41 T.C. 32 (1963).
25. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) provides: "There shall be allowed as a deduction
all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying
on any trade or business. .... "
26. Commissioner v. Mendel, 351 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1965).
27. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 262.
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The holding in Mendel is consistent with the view that since Congress
intended the term income to be broadly construed,28 the courts will not
recognize a deduction absent a statutory provision permitting it.2 9
Recently, in England v. United States,3" the Seventh Circuit reversed
a district court decision that excluded from income reimbursements
received by an employee for certain extraordinary incidental moving
expenses. The lower court had reasoned that since the transfer was solely
at the request of the employer, any reasonable expenses incurred, whether
direct or incidental, were really the cost of the employer. On appeal, the
Commissioner contended that under Revenue Ruling 54-42931 reimburse-
ments for incidental expenses were income to the taxpayer. The appellate
court sustained the Commissioner's argument that Revenue Ruling 54-429
had correctly interpreted section 61(a) of the Code. They therefore in-
cluded in income the incidental expense reimbursements and denied a
deduction under the personal expense section of the Code. 32 Furthermore,
the court agreed with the Government that Cavanagh had incorrectly
construed Revenue Ruling 54-429.
Subsequent to the England decision, the Commissioner issued
Revenue Ruling 65-158," 2 which was designed to clarify his previous
position toward reimbursed moving expenses.34 The ruling listed various
reimbursed nontransportational items,35 which, although related to an
employee's move, were nevertheless deemed additional compensation for
services. Specifically citing the England case, the Commissioner noted that
there were no substantial differences between expenses incurred while
awaiting a permanent residence at the new job location and those for
which advice had been requested. In both cases the expenses were "es-
sentially personal . . . expenses of the employee, rather than business
expenses of the employer. 3
In the instant case the Tax Court restricted the primary issue to one
of determining the limit to which "interest or benefit" of the employer
could be extended. Confronted with England, 7 the majority concluded
28. Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 (1949).
29. Royer's, Inc. v. United States, 265 F.2d 615, 617 (5th Cir. 1959).
30. 345 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1965).
31. Supra note 12.
32. Supra note 3.
33. 1965-1 Cum BULL. 34.
34. Rev. Rul. 54-429; supra note 12.
35. Specific examples of the items concerning which advice has been sought are:
preliminary trips to the new place of employment to locate a suitable residence;
the amount by which the net selling price of the employee's residence at the former
place of employment fell below its appraised value; fee incurred in connection with
the sale of that residence and the purchase of a different residence at the new place
of employment; charges for connecting and disconnecting appliances and utilities;
alteration and installment of rugs and draperies at the new residence; drivers and
auto licenses required by the State to which the employee moved; and similar costs
related to the move.
Supra note 33, at 34.
36. Ibid.
37. Supra note 30.
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that the cases relied on by the Seventh Circuit were not directly on point.
The court maintained that to refuse an exclusion from income of reim-
bursed incidental moving expenses under any circumstances did not
coincide with present legislative intent38 nor "the economic realities of the
situation.139 Under proper circumstances, which were shown in the instant
case,
[T]he concept of the "interest of the employer" covers those
costs which are actually incurred to effect the change in location,
including those temporary living expenses at the new post of
duty. In so holding, we do not feel that we have opened an
avenue for unwarranted advantage.4°
The Mendel4 case was distinguished on the ground that to allow a
deduction was not relevant to the problem of excluding reimbursed
expenses from gross income.42
With the addition of section 217, as provided by the 1964 Revenue
Act,43 a deduction is allo';ed for reasonable expenses paid by an employee
in moving to a new job location. The deduction applies to both new and
old employees. If the employee is reimbursed by his employer, he can still
deduct his expenses if he includes in income the amount of the reimburse-
ment. However, section 217 does not permit a deduction for incidental
moving expenses. By statute, Congress attempted to equalize the moving
expense dilemma. The Starr decision, which extended Revenue Ruling
54-429"4 to its logical conclusion, once again provided an inequality in the
tax treatment of moving expenses.
38. The court took note of the Senate Report in § 217 of the 1954 Revenue Act. The
report stated that although a deduction will be allowed for moving expenses under § 217
(limited to direct moving expenses)
[N]o inference should be drawn from this, however, that moving expense exclusions
under existing law are necessarily limited to these .. .categories. . . .The question
of whether the exclusion for existing employees extends beyond these ...categories
is left for judicial interpretation.
S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 71-72 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
39. Today, due to our expanded economy, the great demand for skilled labor requires
that they become a mobile force. By reimbursing his employees for all moving costs, the
employer insures their presence in needed areas. Reimbursement plans presently in existence
indicate that the costs are in reality the costs of the employer, not the employee. Homer H.
Starr, I 46.78 P-H T.C. at 46-533 (Sept. 26, 1966).
40. ff 46.78 P-H T.C. at 46-533.
41. Supra note 26.
42. In the instant case the employee was required to bear a double burden. He had to
maintain his family in California and himself in Wyoming. The Cavanagh rationale of extra-
ordinary expenses should apply in this situation. What could be a more extraordinary expense
than having to maintain two residences because of an unrequested transfer?
43. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954. Section 217 now allows a new or old employee to exclude
from income any reimbursements received for direct moving expenses. The instant tax court
case extends the exclusion for incidental moving expenses only to reimbursed old employees.
Therefore, the courts are faced with first determining whether an employee is new or old
before allowing an exclusion for reimbursed incidental moving expenses.
44. Supra note 12.
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On the basis of the instant case, an old employee who is reimbursed
for incidental moving expenses enjoys a tax advantage over his co-worker
who, when reimbursed for his incidental moving expenses, was a newly
hired employee. The former can exclude his reimbursement from income,
while the latter, under Revenue Ruling 65-158"5 and section 217, is not
afforded this privilege. This inequality also pertains to a new or old
employee who is not reimbursed for his incidental moving expenses. The
Tax Court in Starr stated that the availability of a deduction was not
relevant to the problem of excludability. Therefore, under the rationale
of the instant case, it is most likely that a deduction for incidental moving
expenses under section 217 will still be disallowed.
As the law now exists it provides: (1) an exclusion from income for
reimbursed moving expenses received by an old employee; (2) an inclu-
sion in income, with no deduction allowed, for reimbursed incidental
moving expenses received by a new employee; (3) a denial of deduction
by a new or old employee not reimbursed for incidental moving expenses.
Any attempt to resolve the problem of incidental reimbursed moving
expenses requires that a variety of approaches be considered. First, the
instant case could be overruled or a nonacquiesence issued by the Com-
missioner. This would, in effect, sustain the England decision and the
Service's interpretation of section 61(a) in Revenue Ruling 65-158.
Second, both the above ruling and the England case could be struck by
legislation, and all moving expenses, whether direct or incidental, would
be required to come within the purview of section 217 of the Code. This
action, although providing equality in the moving expense area of the tax
law, would impair the mobility of labor and ignore the "economic
realities of the situation" so often alluded to in the instant case. The best
solution, in the writer's opinion, would be the enactment of legislation
specifically providing for an exclusion from income of reimbursed inci-
dental moving expenses, and the allowance of a deduction for un-
reimbursed incidental moving expenses. Legislation to this effect was
recently attempted, but Congress adjourned before a vote could be taken
upon the bill."6
STANLEY KUPERSTEIN
45. Supra note 33.
46. S. 3181, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). The bill would have allowed an exclusion from
income of reimbursements received by an employee for expenses incurred for the following:
a house hunting trip between the new and old job location, a thirty day limit for temporary
living expenses at the new job location, expenses incidental to the sale or exchange of a
taxpayer's old residence, expenses incidental to the purchase of a new residence at the new
job location, and other miscellaneous expenses connected with the transfer limited to two
weeks of the employee's weekly salary or one thousand dollars, whichever is smaller. The
transfer must be to a place at least twenty miles from the employee's previous place of
work, and the taxpayer must have been an employee of the employer for the preceding
year.
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